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 Scott v HMRC: principles, policies and interpretation  
 
Introduction 
 
A poet cannot dictate how their poem should be read. Once the words are published to the 
world, they lack the authority to determine the poem’s meaning. That is not to say that the 
poet’s subjective intention should be disregarded, indeed it may provide context for how the 
poem should be read. Critically though, the words become alienated from the author’s 
control. This too is the general case with regard to words in statutes subject to the narrow 
exception established in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart.1 What the sponsoring minister 
states about a Bill generally provides no more than context. The meaning and hence the 
underlying purpose of the statute, in other words the content of the rules, should be derived 
from a close reading of the text.  
This separation of the context from the content of words in a statute is one principle 
of statutory construction which underpinned the judgment of the Upper Tribunal (UT) in 
Scott v HMRC (Scott v HMRC (UT)).2 The other principle is that, when searching for the 
purpose of words in a statute, the tribunals and courts will seek to interpret legislation in a 
manner which brings coherence to the law. When these two principles are combined, as 
demonstrated by HMRC’s success before both the First-tier Tribunal (FTT)3 and the UT in 
Scott v HMRC, a taxpayer will struggle to convince a tribunal or court that a broad policy goal 
mentioned in a ministerial statement should be used in order to produce what approaches 
incoherence across statutory provisions.  
Further, the case illustrates the inefficiency of the limitation on public law issues 
being heard by the FTT, something analysed by the writer in an earlier issue of this Review.4 
 
Facts and judgment 
 
There is little to mention in terms of the facts in Scott v HMRC (UT) as the parties agreed the 
relevant quanta. The only issue that the UT had to decide was one of principle, namely what 
would be the tax outcome of claiming an amount for Corresponding Deficiency Relief (CDR) 
on the termination of an insurance policy that is greater than a taxpayer’s income. This in turn 
would have a bearing on the rate of tax on unrelated capital gains that the taxpayer should 
pay. However, a read through the judgment of the FTT reveals that the taxpayer was a man of 
considerable means, who was claiming a large amount in respect of CDR5 and thus this 
matter of principle was of considerable practical significance.  
By way of background, section 4 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 
(TCGA) dictates the rate at which tax is charged on capital gains, which in turn is linked to 
the rate at which income tax is charged. The general rule in respect of an individual is that if 
the taxpayer is subject in a given year to the higher rate of tax on any part of their income, 
then chargeable gains will also be subject to the higher rate applicable to gains (now 20 per 
cent).6 To the extent that the taxpayer’s income does not reach the top of the income tax basic 
rate band, their capital gains are charged at the lower rate of, now, 10 per cent.7 The effect is 
to reduce disparity in the treatment of capital gains and income. 
                                                             
1 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593; [1992] STC 898 (HL). 
2 Andrew Scott v HMRC [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC). 
3 Andrew Scott v HMRC (Scott v HMRC (FTT)) [2017] UKFTT 385 (TC); [2017] STI 1616. 
4 S. Daly, “Public Law in the Tax Tribunals and the Case for Reform” [2018] BTR 94. 
5 See for instance Scott v HMRC (FTT), above fn.3, [2017] UKFTT 385 (TC), Appendix 1 at [8] where 
it is stated that the taxpayer’s total income for those two years was circa £45 million and that CDR of 
circa £20 million was being claimed. 
6 Or 28% if the gains are residential property gains: TCGA s.4(4). 
7 TCGA s.4(2)(b). 
 Meanwhile, gains on life insurance policies are treated as income in the hands of the 
policyholder.8 When the policy comes to an end the computation of the final gain may result 
in a negative amount9 and there will be no tax on the termination of the policy in this event. 
However, if, during the term of the policy, previous gains have been chargeable as income, 
CDR may provide some relief against other income or gains taxed in the year of the 
termination of the policy. CDR is, accordingly, a relief on income tax but does not operate 
like usual reliefs in the sense that it does not reduce the taxable income of a taxpayer, but 
rather it reduces the amount of income which is subject to the higher rate of tax.10 In other 
words, it does not affect the quantum which is chargeable to tax, but it does affect the rate 
which is to be applied. Section 6(2) TCGA, which was operative in the tax years concerned in 
the case and which was subsequently replaced by section 4A TCGA, provided a means of 
using the relief in conjunction with capital gains. 
If the income reduced by CDR results in a figure which is below the top of the basic 
rate band, this produces a portion of unused basic rate band. Any capital gains within the band 
would be charged at the lower rate. Scott v HMRC (UT), however, turned on what should be 
the outcome where the CDR claimed exceeds the income in that year. In this event, either that 
excess, in addition to the amount of the basic rate band, should be available to set against any 
capital gains taxable at the higher rate (the taxpayer’s argument)11 or the excess should be 
ignored for the purpose of calculating the rate for capital gains (HMRC’s argument).12 A 
component of the taxpayer’s argument was that the effect of the relevant provisions was 
simply to extend the basic rate band by the amount of CDR claimed and thus any unused part 
of that augmented band could be used in respect of any capital gains.13  
Although the dispute related only to two tax years (2006–2007 and 2007–2008) and 
the essential arguments of the parties remained the same, the case was slightly complicated by 
the fact that different sets of statutory provisions applied to the different years owing to the 
interposition of the Law Rewrite Project (Rewrite) and the Income Tax Act 2007. 
The UT agreed with HMRC,14 thereby upholding the decision of the FTT. First, CDR 
should operate like any other relief or allowance and as such it should not be possible to 
produce a negative income figure after applying it.15 There was nothing to be found in the 
statutory language to suggest it should be different.16 Instead the Rewrite explicitly provided 
in its Explanatory Notes that a “deduction can only be made from income to the extent that 
there is income to absorb the deduction”.17 Secondly, section 6(2) TCGA protected the benefit 
of the basic rate band by leaving out of account any income not brought into account for 
higher rate income tax purposes.18 It did not extend the basic rate band. Thus, the maximum 
amount of basic rate band that could be used in calculating the rate applicable to capital gains 
would be the band itself.19 Thirdly, if the result were otherwise, then that would mean that a 
relief on income tax provided in the income tax legislation would in effect be available as a 
                                                             
8 ITTOIA s.461. 
9 See HMRC, Internal Manual, Insurance Policyholder Taxation Manual, IPTM3860 (19 March 2016, 
updated 5 August 2016), available at: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/insurance-
policyholder-taxation-manual/iptm3860 [Accessed 8 October 2018] where it is explained that this will 
be the case if total benefits fall short of total deductions plus previous gains. 
10 ITTOIA s.539. 
11 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [28].   
12 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [27]. 
13 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [30]. 
14 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [31] and [64].  
15 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [32] and [60]. 
16 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [32]. 
17 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [60]. See Explanatory Notes to ITA 
2007, s.25, para.110. 
18 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [35]. 
19 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [35] and [58]. 
 relief on capital gains.20 Such a broad purpose could not be discerned from the legislation—it 
does not provide for a perfect integration of income tax and capital gains tax.21 The taxpayer’s 
argument was that the purpose of the legislation was to tax capital gains and income at the 
same marginal rate—but that interpretation would be inconsistent with the usual application 
of losses and reliefs.22 Fourthly, HMRC’s approach would align with the ordinary meaning of 
the provisions, whereby the meaning of basic rate band should be interpreted as that band of 
income which is taxed at the basic rate.23 Curiously, the UT examined the arguments first on 
the basis of the earlier iteration of the legislation and then found that the later iteration had the 
same effect. Given that the Rewrite was supposed to clarify the law, one would have expected 
the starting point to be the rewritten and clearer rules.  
Ultimately, the taxpayer’s argument hinged on the idea that the purpose of the 
legislation was to unify the tax rates on income and chargeable gains, relying inter alia upon 
the Budget speech of Nigel Lawson, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, which 
accompanied the introduction of what is now section 4 TCGA.24 The UT disagreed that such 
a general policy, which might underlie the provisions, could be elevated into a principle of 
interpretation.25 Policies provide context, principles determine content. In this vein, 
Dworkin’s distinction between policies and principles may be recalled: policies provide goals, 
principles impose obligations.26 It fell short similarly of satisfying the conditions set out in 
Pepper v Hart,27 which established the limited circumstances in which reference to the 
parliamentary record is permissible for the purposes of constructing an Act. First, the 
legislation was not ambiguous; secondly, Nigel Lawson was not promoting a Bill at the time 
of the speech; and, finally, Nigel Lawson’s speech did not express an answer to the specific 
question at hand. Instead the UT found that the general principle underpinning the provisions 
was that the applications of reliefs and allowances should not produce a negative income.28  
 
Comments  
 
It is difficult to disagree with the overall result in the case, given that the taxpayer’s case 
required a narrow reading of the provisions combined with some heavy reliance upon general 
statements made by Nigel Lawson. This note shall make three brief points about the case: the 
first relating to the principles of construction; the second stressing the importance of the 
judgment in terms of understanding the operation of the capital gains legislation; and the final 
point concerning the distinction between appeal and judicial review. 
First, the UT took the correct approach to the relevance of Nigel Lawson’s speech, in 
that it could only be seen at best as setting the context but not the content of the legislation. In 
the “last untelevised [Budget] speech”29 Nigel Lawson proposed that a gain should be “taxed 
at the income tax rate that would apply if it were the taxpayer’s marginal slice of income”30 
and thus proposed to bring “greater neutrality to the tax system”.31  
The fact that there may be recourse to ministerial statements does not undermine the 
content/context distinction. This is recognised by the Pepper v Hart exception. It is possible 
for such statements to provide the content of rules, because “legislative intention is the 
                                                             
20 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [35]. 
21 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [35]. 
22 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [35] and [60]. 
23 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [37] and [57]. 
24 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [65]–[71]. 
25 See Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [71] in particular. 
26 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Reprint edn (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 20. 
27 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [67]–[69]. 
28 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [32] and [61]. 
29 Hansard, HC Deb, Vol 129, col 993 (15 March 1988). 
30 Hansard, HC Deb, Vol 129, col 1005 (15 March 1988). 
31 Hansard, HC Deb, Vol 129, col 1005 (15 March 1988). 
 product of the process that produces the text”,32 and as such ministerial statements “may or 
may not come to be recognised as acts of the legislature”.33 But the problem for the taxpayer 
in the case is that the statements do not elaborate upon the specific content of the relevant 
provisions. They do not expound a general principle against which all provisions concerning 
the interaction of income and capital gains ought to be construed or, in this case specifically, 
how the rules concerning capital gains tax rates should interact with CDR. Instead, the speech 
provided little more than a broad Government intention. Nigel Lawson did not seek to bring 
complete neutrality to the treatment of income and capital gains—he could have done so by 
using express wording to that effect in the statute (though it is a task perhaps beyond the 
capacities of all but a Herculean Chancellor), but he did not signal such an intention. Even a 
cursory glance at the interrelationship between the taxation of capital gains and income will 
reveal continued myriad asymmetries. As noted by the FTT and accepted by the UT,34 “the 
legislation does not provide for a perfect integration of income tax and CGT”.35 If it were to 
be so, one would expect the legislation to “allow for reliefs from income tax to reduce capital 
gains and vice versa”.36 
Ultimately then the taxpayer failed to convince the Tribunal that the policy goal of 
neutrality could be elevated to a principle of construction. It provided context not content. As 
an aside, it is contestable whether neutrality in itself is a desirable goal. It is certainly 
desirable where the lack of neutrality is unjustified, but that only begs the question of what 
should be viewed as a legitimate justification.  
In its search for principles of construction, the Tribunal instead favoured a reading of 
the legislation which would align with other similar provisions and thereby reduce complexity 
and confusion.37 To this end, the Tribunal found that a general principle underpinned the 
provisions whereby reliefs and allowances could not give rise to a negative income.38 This 
would mean that CDR would operate like any other relief or allowance rather than on its own 
terms. This reading is not without difficulty however. That CDR is itself anomalous, in that it 
does not reduce the quantum of taxable income as reliefs and allowances ordinarily do but 
rather affects tax rates, was swept aside by the Tribunal.39 
Secondly, aside from highlighting how tribunals and courts will construe the content 
of legislation, the case also contains an important discussion on key terms in the capital gains 
legislation thereby underlining the relevance of the case. It is clear now that the “basic rate 
band” means the limit below which income tax is chargeable at the lower rate and it cannot be 
extended beyond this amount. Further, the purpose of what is now section 4(5) TCGA has 
been authoritatively explained to be that the taxpayer may use for capital gains tax any part of 
their basic rate band that has not been used for income tax. Most importantly, the case 
determined that section 6(2) TCGA, now found in section 4A TCGA, may not be used in such 
a manner as to produce a negative income. 
Finally, it should be noted that the taxpayer was unsuccessful in a separate judicial 
review hearing.40 The essence of that case was that the taxpayer had a legitimate expectation 
that his gains would be subject to the lower rate of capital gains tax. This was on the basis of 
a calculation performed by the taxpayer (or more specifically by his advisers) using HMRC 
software.41 The High Court ultimately found that there was no representation sufficient to 
                                                             
32 J. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament” (2007) 123 
LQR 53, 72. 
33 Freedman, above fn.32, 72. 
34 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [35]. 
35 Scott v HMRC (FTT), above fn.3, [2017] UKFTT 385 (TC) at [94]. 
36 Scott v HMRC (FTT), above fn.3, [2017] UKFTT 385 (TC) at [94]. 
37 On this, see T.R.S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution and Common Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2013), 5. 
38 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [32] and [61]. 
39 Scott v HMRC (UT), above fn.2, [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC) at [32]. 
40 R. (on the application of Scott) v HMRC (R. (Scott) v HMRC) [2015] EWHC 2810 (Admin). 
41 R. (Scott) v HMRC, above fn.40, [2015] EWHC 2810 (Admin) at [7]. 
 give rise to a legitimate expectation,42 but even if there had been such representation HMRC 
would be justified in frustrating the expectation given the large amounts of tax at stake.43 But 
had the taxpayer succeeded in the judicial review, then the substantive appeal would have 
been redundant and vice versa. As this writer has argued in an earlier article in this Review,44 
it is entirely inefficient for there to be two parallel cases in such an instance when the case 
could collapse on the resolution of either dispute. 
 
Stephen Daly• 
                                                             
42 R. (Scott) v HMRC, above fn.40, [2015] EWHC 2810 (Admin) at [11]–[13]. 
43 R. (Scott) v HMRC, above fn.40, [2015] EWHC 2810 (Admin) at [15]. 
44 Daly, above fn.4. 
• Lecturer in Corporate Law, King’s College London. Thanks to Thomas Fairclough for highlighting 
articles relevant to the case note. 
